We've mapped 130 Persian Gulf loading berths and estimate loading activity from analysis of Sentinel-1 and Sentinel-2 imagery covering those sites.

We compare this signal with the 2025 baseline, calculated using the same sites and counting method, then multiply the ratio by the 20 mbpd pre-war liquids flow to estimate Gulf loadings in mbpd.

We derive this estimate from analysis of Sentinel-1 and Sentinel-2 satellite imagery covering every Red Sea loading berth that may be fed by the East–West Pipeline. Observed loading volumes on each satellite pass are compared with a pre-war average calculated from 2025 imagery using the same counting method.

We multiply that ratio by known pre-war export volumes from the IEA and Kpler to estimate total exports. Historically, this methodology has produced estimates within 10% of Kpler's own.

We infer 'flow' from observed loadings because in the absence of rising oil on water inside the Gulf, there is nowhere else for this oil to go. There is currently no evidence of rising oil on water in the Gulf.

And conceptually, tankers loading inside the Persian Gulf at this point in the war entered through the strait since the war started, which implies that strait transit is not an issue for them in the absence of deteriorating conditions after entry.

Further, at prior inflection points in the war such as the signing and later collapse of the MoU, visible Persian Gulf loadings rose and fell exactly as you would expect if this represented a continuous in and out flow dependent on strait conditions.

Thus observed loadings strongly infer export to world markets outside the strait.

We identify empty oil and product tankers crossing into the Gulf of Oman and estimate their carrying capacity as deadweight tonnage multiplied by seven. This is a leading indicator rather than a direct next-day forecast because vessels may wait or load several days after arrival. At inflection points in the war these vessels may also wind up never loading.